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PRECAP; State of Montana v. James Morris Colburn: When the Sole
Defense is Precluded by Montana’s Rape Shield Law
Caitlin S. Williams

No. DA 14-0181 Montana Supreme Court
Oral Argument: Wednesday, December 2, 2015 at 9:30 AM in the
Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek Justice
Building, Helena, Montana.
I. QUESTION PRESENTED
Did application of Montana’s rape shield law, excluding
evidence of the victim’s motive to fabricate and source of sexual
knowledge, violate the Defendant’s constitutional right to present a
complete defense?
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant James Morris Colburn was charged with two counts of
incest of his daughter, “C.C.”, age eleven, and sexual intercourse without
consent and two counts of sexual assault of his neighbor “R.W.”, age
eleven.1 Colburn was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to
Montana State Prison for 100 years.2 Although Colburn initially appealed
each of these charges, the issue on appeal was ultimately narrowed to the
charges regarding the sexual abuse of R.W.3
During a forensic interview, R.W. described two separate
incidents in which Colburn molested her in various ways.4 R.W. was
interviewed about these incidents by Nurse Mary Pat Hanson at the First
STEP Resource Center at St. Patrick’s Hospital.5 Based on the interview,
Hanson concluded that R.W. possessed sexual knowledge consistent with
that of a child who experienced sexual abuse.6 The video of Hanson’s
interview with R.W. was played for the jury at trial.7
Prior to trial, Colburn filed a motion in limine seeking to
introduce evidence of an alternative source for R.W.’s sexual knowledge,

Appellee’s Response Br. at 1, State of Montana v. James Morris Colburn, (Mont. June 15,
2015)(DA 14-0181).
2
Id. at 5.
3
Appellee’s Supplemental Reply Br. at 1, State of Montana v. James Morris Colburn, (Mont. Oct. 9,
2015)(DA 14-0181).
4
Appellee’s Response Br. at 3.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 4.
7
Id.
1
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specifically alleged sexual abuse by her biological father.8 However, the
introduction of evidence of prior sexual abuse is inadmissible under
Montana’s “rape shield” statute.9 The district court reserved ruling on the
motion until trial, where it was ultimately deemed inadmissible.10
Colburn appeals this determination.11
III. ARGUMENT
A. Whether the application of the rape shield violated Appellant’s
constitutional right to a defense?
Montana’s rape shield statute states:
Evidence concerning the sexual conduct of the victim is
inadmissible in prosecutions . . . except evidence of the
victim’s past sexual conduct with the offender or
evidence of specific instances of the victim’s sexual
activity to show the origin of semen, pregnancy, or
disease that is at issue in the prosecution.12
Colburn argues the application of the rape shield deprived him of
his constitutional right to present a defense13 “as guaranteed by the Fifth,
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
Article II, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution.”14 He proposes that
the Court employ a case-specific balancing test to weigh “the interests
expressed in the statute against the force of the defendant’s
constitutionally-protected right to a defense . . . to determine whether the
particular exclusion of evidence under the rule was unconstitutional.”15
More specifically, Colburn argues that the exclusion of evidence of a
possible alternative source of R.W.’s sexual knowledge and the
exclusion of evidence of R.W.’s alleged motive to fabricate her
allegations against him prevented him from presenting a complete
defense.16
The State argues the district court did not err in applying the rape
shield to this case, as “Montana’s Rape Shield Law was designed to
Br. of Appellant at 2, State of Montana v. James Morris Colburn, (Mont. Dec. 9, 2014)(DA 140181).
9
Id.
10
Id. at 10–11.
11
Appellant’s Supplemental Reply Br. at 2, State of Montana v. James Morris Colburn, (Mont. Oct.
23, 2015)(DA 14-0181).
12
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–5–511(2).
13
Appellant’s Supplemental Reply Br. at 7.
14
Br. of Appellant at 11.
15
Appellant’s Supplemental Reply Br. at 2.
16
Id.
8
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protect the privacy and dignity of the victims of sexual crimes.”17
Further, the State argues the two exceptions present in the statute, (1)
allowing evidence of past sexual conduct between the victim and the
offender, and (2) allowing evidence of the origin of semen, pregnancy, or
disease, are not applicable in this case.18 As to the first exception,
Colburn’s defense does not stem from prior sexual activity between
himself and R.W., but rather is directed at R.W.’s prior sexual activity
with another offender.19 Regarding the second exception, pregnancy and
disease are not at issue and Colburn did not present any proof of R.W.’s
sexual activity, which is the requirement for showing the origin of
semen.20 Based on these conclusions, the State argues the application of
the rape shield is appropriate, and notes that, where the exceptions are
not met, the Montana Supreme Court “has repeatedly rejected arguments
that application of the rape shield law violates a defendant’s
constitutional rights to confrontation or to present a defense.”21
Specifically, Colburn raises two separate theories he was unable
to present at trial due to the application of the rape shield law.
1. Motive to Fabricate
Colburn argues the preclusion of evidence pointing towards the
victim’s motive to fabricate evidence of sexual assault violated his right
to present a complete defense.22 He asserts that R.W. used her allegedly
false allegations against him to “test the waters” with her mother and
gauge her reaction to those allegations before revealing the allegedly true
incident of sexual abuse imposed by her biological father.23 Colburn
argues that after her mother believed her allegations toward Colburn,
R.W. felt “safe” enough to disclose the “higher-stakes” abuse by her
father.24 However, since Colburn was not allowed to introduce the
alleged sexual assault of R.W. by her father, he argues the jury was
unable to consider R.W.’s motive to fabricate the allegations against
him.25 Colburn states “the Constitution protects a defendant’s right to
introduce and argue a motive to fabricate . . . without a court having to
find the jury necessarily would have believed the theory.” 26

Appellee’s Response Br. at 19.
Id. at 20.
19
Id. at 20–21.
20
Id. at 21.
21
Appellee’s Supplemental Br. at 4.
22
Appellant’s Supplemental Reply Br. at 7.
23
Id. at 14–15.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 16–17.
26
Id.
17
18
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Conversely, the State argues that Colburn’s theory of R.W.’s
motive to fabricate was unsubstantiated absent expert testimony. 27
Similarly, the State contends Colburn’s attempt to use Nurse Hanson’s
testimony that “children can sometimes lie” to prove that R.W. had
motive to fabricate her allegations was also unfounded, as the “testimony
by Hanson left Colburn’s fabrication theory merely a theory, an
unsubstantiated guess, an argument at best that rests only upon a
platitude, no expert was required to assert, that children can sometimes
lie.”28
2. Source of Knowledge
Additionally, Colburn argues the exclusion of evidence pointing
to an alternative source of R.W.’s sexual knowledge violated his right to
present a complete defense,29 as “the State at trial chose to use R.W.’s
sexual knowledge to bolster her credibility and prove its case, then used
the rape shield to exclude relevant rebuttal evidence.”30 Further, Colburn
asserts that since jurors would “naturally infer” that R.W. must have
been sexually abused to have such “graphic sexual knowledge,” he
should “be permitted to rebut the inference” that the victim was sexually
abused and could not have fabricated the allegations.31 As Colburn
initially sought to introduce R.W.’s statements to Nurse Hanson
regarding sexual abuse by her father,32 Colburn now argues this evidence
was necessary to presenting a complete defense, as “[t]he evidence of
abuse by R.W.’s father was relevant to rebut the powerful inference of
Colburn’s guilt from R.W.’s sexual abuse knowledge and Nurse
Hanson’s assessment of R.W.’s credibility based on R.W.’s sexual abuse
knowledge.”33
In response, the State cites a prior case, State of Montana v. Van
Pelt,34 arguing the Court had previously rejected the very argument
Colburn now asserts:
Appellant cannot argue . . . that he does not seek to
attack [the victim’s] credibility but rather seeks to
demonstrate that [the victim] could have gained her
knowledge of sex outside of her contact with the
defendant . . . Whether under the guise of showing the
jury how [the victim] may have obtained her knowledge
Appellee’s Supplemental Br. at 9–10.
Id. at 10.
29
Appellant’s Supplemental Reply Br. at 7.
30
Id. at 7–8.
31
Id. at 8–9.
32
Id. at 11–12.
33
Id. at 13.
34
805 P.2d 549 (Mont. 1991).
27
28
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of sex, or not, the fact is appellant wished to convince
the jury that [the victim] fabricated charges against
him.35
The State further argues evidence of R.W.’s alleged abuse by her
father lacked relevance and is therefore inadmissible pursuant to Rule
401 of the Montana Rules of Evidence.36 Similarly, the evidence is
insufficient under Rule 403 because “the details related to the proposed
evidence were so sketchy that the district court could easily have
concluded that the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed the
purported probative value.”37
Notably, the State did concede that “some of Colburn’s
criticisms are justified, as the State did overlook the fact that Colburn
asserted matters shown in other court records of the father’s alleged
sexual abuse of R.W.”38 However, the State then takes the opportunity to
further its own argument by identifying “that Colburn never tied the
father’s sexual abuse of R.W. to drawing and depictions R.W. reported
was Colburn’s rape of her.”39 Additionally, “Colburn had the ability to
develop . . . more specific information regarding the father’s prior sexual
assault . . . ” but failed to.40
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Applicability of the Rape Shield
The Court is likely to first address the overarching issue of
whether or not the rape shield is applicable in this case. Although the
State acknowledged that this Court has regularly upheld application of
the rape shield as constitutional,41 the fact that the law precludes
Colburn’s sole defense suggests the Court may question the State on this
matter. Setting aside the horrific nature of the allegations against him,
one cannot quickly dismiss the fact that Colburn was essentially
prevented from presenting a defense. Given Colburn’s constitutional
right to present a complete defense, the State must show a clear and
compelling reason behind its argument if it is to prevail.
The two defense theories Colburn was prevented from asserting
will be included within the discussion of whether it was appropriate to
apply the rape shield in this case: (1) R.W.’s alleged motive to fabricate
Appellee’s Supplemental Br. at 11–12 (citing Van Pelt, 805 P.2d at 552).
Id. at 16–17; see also Mont. R. Evid. 401.
37
Id. at 17; see also Mont. R. Evid. 403.
38
Appellee’s Supplemental Br. at 16.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 4.
35
36
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the allegations against him, and (2) R.W.’s alleged alternative source of
sexual knowledge.
1. Motive to Fabricate
The issue of whether the jury should have been able to hear
Colburn’s theory that R.W. had reason to fabricate the allegations against
him will likely be the main subject of debate between the parties. The
State admitted that it failed to sufficiently address that Colburn raised
some degree of evidence that R.W. had been sexually abused by her
father.42 This admission gives Colburn some momentum in his argument
that R.W. had reason to fabricate her allegations against him as a means
of “testing the waters” with her mother before disclosing the “higher
stakes” allegations against her father. However, the State still has a
strong case that the evidence of R.W.’s alleged sexual abuse by her
father is inadmissible under the rape shield for public policy reasons.
There is a significant interest in protecting victims from scrutiny
surrounding their character, and the State argues for heightened
protections for victims who are minors.43 The Court will likely address
the legitimate public policy concerns that would arise if victims were
subject to greater attack on cross-examination, particularly considering
the sensitive nature of the allegations and the inherent hesitancy to come
forward with allegations in the first place.
2. Source of Knowledge
The Court will likely dismiss this argument fairly quickly. The
fact that Colburn relies primarily on out-of-state cases44 while the State
presents Montana case law discussing the exact issue in question45
suggests that the Court will quickly affirm its own previous ruling.
Public policy concerns are again at issue here, in that if the Court were to
rule that a potential alternative source of R.W.’s sexual knowledge was
admissible, it would open the door to a myriad of defendants asserting
that their accuser obtained his or her sexual knowledge from an
alternative source. Given the fact that Montana’s rape shield statute is
designed to protect victims from having their sexual histories examined
by juries in excruciating detail, the Court is very likely to dismiss
Colburn’s argument.

Id.
Appellee’s Response Br. at 19.
44
Appellee’s Supplemental Br. at 20.
45
Id. at 11–12.
42
43
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V. PREDICTION
The Montana Supreme Court will likely agree that the
application of the rape shield did not violate Colburn’s constitutional
right to a defense, and even if it did, the State’s legitimate interest in
protecting victims of sexual assault outweighs Colburn’s interests.

